文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：基于三方演化博弈模型的林长制横向协作机制研究

英文题名：Research on the operation mechanism of forest chief system based on a tripartite evolutionary game

作者：李源[1] 王超[1] 梁越颖[1] 徐斌[2] 宁攸凉[1]

第一作者：李源

机构：[1]中国林业科学研究院林业科技信息研究所,北京100091;[2]中国林业科学研究院,北京100091

年份：2025

卷号：49

期号：4

起止页码：253-262

中文期刊名：南京林业大学学报(自然科学版)

外文期刊名：Journal of Nanjing Forestry University:Natural Sciences Edition

收录：;北大核心:【北大核心2023】；

基金：中国林业科学研究院基本科研业务费专项(CAFBB2023MC004)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：利益相关者;林长制;三方演化博弈模型;横向协作机制;集体行动

外文关键词：stakeholders;forest chief system;tripartite evolutionary game model;horizontal collaboration mechanism;collective action

分类号：F326.2

摘要：【目的】林长制实施过程中面临纵向联动与横向协作的双重挑战,其中横向协作因涉及多方利益且主体间无严格层级关系,协作难度尤甚,成为阻碍林长制高效运转的关键瓶颈。因此,疏理林长制实施过程中各横向利益相关主体间的互动关系,以推动建立横向协作机制,助力林长制推深做实。【方法】本研究将林长制横向利益相关者划分为管理型利益相关者、监督型利益相关者和被动型利益相关者;基于利益相关者理论,构建理论分析框架,建立三方非对称动态演化博弈模型,通过对各方策略选择的演化稳定性和演化路径进行仿真分析。【结果】①生态区位重要性、森林资源丰富度、林业产业发展水平、上级部门和地方政府的重视度是影响各横向协作行为选择的外部因素,它们会影响三方横向协作行为选择的期望收益与付出成本;②期望收益与付出成本不仅是影响三方横向协作行为选择的内部因素,还是决定三方行为选择的关键变量;③由于部分被动型利益相关者游离在林长制组织体系外,调动他们的参与积极性是林长制横向协作的难点问题。【结论】加强林长制横向协作,关键在于通过完善考核制度与奖惩制度,加快构建满足各方参与约束与激励相容原则的长效机制,形成集体行动;其目的在于通过推动林长制尽快从“有名”向“有实”转变,从全面建立到全面见效,实现名实相符。
【Objective】The implementation of the forest chief system faces the dual challenges of vertical linkage and horizontal collaboration.Among them,horizontal collaboration is particularly difficult because it involves multiple interests and there is no strict hierarchical relationship between subjects,which has become a key bottleneck hindering the efficient operation of the forest chief system.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to clarify the interaction between the various horizontal stakeholders and promote the establishment of a horizontal cooperation mechanism.【Method】In this study,the horizontal stakeholders of the forest chief system were divided into management stakeholders,supervision stakeholders and passive stakeholders.Based on the stakeholder theory,a theoretical analysis framework was constructed,and a three-party asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model was established.The evolutionary stability and evolutionary path of each party s strategy selection were simulated and analyzed.【Results】(1)The importance of ecological location,the richness of forest resources,the development level of forestry industry,and the attention of superior departments and local governments were the external factors affecting the choice of horizontal cooperation behavior of the three parties,which affected the expected benefits and costs of the choice of horizontal cooperation behavior of the three parties.(2)The expected return and the cost were not only the internal factors that affect the choice of the three parties‘horizontal cooperation behavior,but also the key variables that determine the choice of the three parties’behavior.(3)It s a difficult problem to mobilize their participation enthusiasm in the horizontal cooperation of the forest chief system,because some passive stakeholders were outside the forest chief system.【Conclusion】To strengthen the horizontal cooperation of the forest chief system,it s key to accelerate the construction of a long-term mechanism which could follow the principles of restraint and incentive compatibility of all parties,and they form collective action through improving the assessment system and reward and punishment system.The purpose of the horizontal cooperation is to promote the transformation of the forest chief system from“nominal”to“real”as soon as possible,from comprehensive establishment to comprehensive effectiveness,and to achieve the unity of name and reality.